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ABSTRACT
This paper explores how the legal environment affects bank behavior in 20 transition
economies. Based on a newly constructed data set we find that banks’ loan portfolio
composition depends on the legal environment. If banks operate in a well-functioning
legal environment they lend relatively more to SMEs and provide more mortgages.
On the other hand, banks lend more to large enterprises and to the government if the
legal system is unsound. As a transmission channel we identify the banks’ willingness
to accept collateral which depends on the bankers’ perceptions of the prevailing laws
regarding collateral.
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1. Introduction
The link between the legal system and credit market development has been the subject of
considerable interest. In their original papers La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and
Vishny (1997, 1998) and more recently Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer (forthcoming) show
that the size of credit markets depend on the legal origin as well as the prevailing creditor
rights in a country. On a micro level, Haselmann, Vig, and Pistor (2006) find that banks
expand their credit supply once legal rights improve. These papers, however, say little about
how the legal environment affects the size and composition of capital market activity. For
example, how do differences in the legal system influence a banker’s lending decision? Do
creditors simply lend more to the same customers if they operate in a better institutional
setting, or do they lend to new types of customers? Under what circumstances are creditors
willing to take risk and engage in lending under asymmetric information? In order to answer
these questions, we need detailed information on the loan portfolio of creditors that operate
in different institutional settings.
In this paper we show that differences in the legal system influence the loan portfo-
lios of banks with data from a new survey of bankers from the transition countries. Prior
work has been unable to relate loan composition to cross country differences in the legal
environment because information on the banks’ borrowers has not been available. Such in-
formation is generally not on financial statements that are commonly used in cross country
credit market development studies. Although detailed bank portfolio data are available for
some developed countries such as the U.S., consistent information on bank behavior and the
banking environment from many countries is difficult to obtain. In this paper we utilize data
from a 2005 EBRD survey, the Banking Environment and Performance Survey (BEPS). By
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conducting more than 200 face-to-face interviews with leading bank managers in 20 tran-
sition economies, information on banks’ loan portfolios as well as the bankers’ perceptions
was obtained.1 An additional novelty of this study is that we distinguish between the influ-
ence of the bankers’ perceptions of their legal environment and the influence of objective
measures of the quality of the legal system.
The paper offers three findings: First, differences in the legal environment are an im-
portant determinant of the composition of bank loan portfolios. Better legal systems are
associated with less lending to low asymmetric information customers such as large and
government-owned enterprises. Similarly, when bankers have positive perceptions of the
legal environment, there tends to be relatively more lending to information opaque borrow-
ers such as SMEs and mortgage borrowers. Consequently, a better legal environment does
not only foster a bigger credit market as established in aggregate cross country studies (the
‘law and finance’ literature cited above), but also shifts the composition of lending towards
private sector capital formation.
Second, we identify collateral as the main trigger for creditors to lend to information
opaque entities. The willingness to accept collateral depends on the actual legal system, as
well as the banker’s perception of the legal environment. Once lenders accept different types
of assets as collateral, they are more willing to engage in lending that involves considerable
asymmetric information.
Finally, we find that not only the actual quality of the legal system influences bank be-
havior, but also the individual banker’s perceptions of the law. Thus, even after controlling
1The transition economies provide an ideal laboratory for examining the effects of the legal environment
on bankers’ lending decisions because progress towards a market economy has resulted in wide variation in
the performance and functions of banks in the countries in our data. This is especially true for creditor rights
as pointed out by Pistor (2000).
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for country heterogeneity we find that bankers’ perceptions influences their lending deci-
sions. Therefore policies to encourage capital formation should not only address the laws
enacted, but also develop confidence in the operation of the legal system.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 motivates the link between creditor rights
and the portfolio decision of banks and develops the hypotheses tested. In section 3, the
banking survey and descriptive statistics are presented. The empirical analysis is provided
in section 4 and section 5 concludes.
2. Motivation and Hypotheses
Our paper builds on two strands of literature and fills a gap between them. First, we have
already cited the law and finance literature which established the link between the quality
of the legal environment and aggregate capital market development. The main conclusion
from this literature is that better legal systems and institutions seem to cause better outcomes
for financial markets. Second, the corporate finance literature has demonstrated the link
between institutional environment and the capital structure of firms (e.g. Booth et al. 2001,
Demirgu¨c-Kunt and Maksimovic 1998, 1999). However, there has heretofore been little
work on how the banks themselves are affected.
There are, of course, similarities between the influence of the legal environment on
firms and on banks. According to Demirgu¨c-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998, 1999) a higher
proportion of firms use long-term external financing in countries with a better legal system.
In a related study, Fan, Titman, and Twite (2006) argue that firms operating within legal
systems that provide better protection for financial claimants tend to have more long-term
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debt as a proportion of total debt. Giannetti (2003) finds that in countries with good legal
protections, it is easier for small firms investing in intangible assets to obtain loans. Further-
more, she shows that firms operating in countries that favor creditor rights are associated
with higher leverage and greater availability of long-term debt. Braun (2003) underlines the
importance of tangible assets for lending in poorly developed capital markets. He shows
that industries with fewer tangible assets grow relatively slowly in countries with poorly
developed financial systems.2
In our first hypotheses we relate bankers’ use of collateral to bankers’ perception of
their environment. The importance of collateral in bank lending was established by Bester
(1985), Besanko and Thakor (1987) and Boot and Thakor (1994). They showed that collat-
eral can be an instrument to overcome the asymmetric information problem between lender
and borrower.3 In their framework, collateral serves as a signaling device that offers the
lender a signal about the true riskiness of the borrower.
According to the incomplete contracting literature (e.g. Hart and Moore 1994, 1998),
the terms of a credit contract depend on the bargaining power of the creditor to force re-
payment. The ability to pledge collateral in case of default is such a mechanism through
which lenders control borrowers. Thus, the institutional environment (e.g. collateral laws)
is a determinant of creditors ability to force repayment. In accordance to this argument,
Davydenko and Franks (2004) find that in countries with creditor unfriendly codes banks
2A strengthening of credit rights may, however, not also be associated with a higher availability of external
finance. Vig (2006) shows for Indian firms that improvement in the rights of secured creditors leads to a
reduction in total debt.
3The asymmetric information problems means that only the borrower knows the true riskiness of a project
to be financed (Akerlof 1970). The more difficult it is for the lender to gather information about the project, the
more pronounced is the asymmetric information problem. More recently, Dell’ Ariccia and Marquez (2004)
have shown that the greater the information asymmetries between bank and borrower, the higher the interest
rate charged by the bank.
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recovery rates must be lower. If lenders anticipate this, they adjust their contract terms by
requiring more collateral. The latter suggest a negative link between creditor rights and the
demand for collateral.
Nevertheless, these arguments are based on developed countries. In our sample coun-
tries, institutional uncertainties are generally higher so that it is not clear whether a bank
is able to collect its collateral at all in case of default. The use of collateral in lending ar-
rangements relies on the existence of an appropriate legal framework and a well functioning
court system. Djankov, Hart, McLiesh, and Shleifer (2006) show that the efficacy of debt
enforcement depends on the legal origin of a country as well as structural aspects of debt
contracts and appeals. Empirically, Qian and Strahan (2005) find that in countries with bet-
ter creditor rights, more loans are secured. The use of collateralized loans makes sense if,
in case of default, the legal system allows the lender to obtain possession of the collateral.
Furthermore, a legal system needs to provide the means to register the collateral when a
loan is made in order to prevent borrowers from pledging the same asset more than once.
In our sample countries these issues seem to be of importance to bankers. Therefore, we
think that a good legal system is a prerequisite for a banker to be willing to accept collateral
in a lending arrangement. Note that this notion is different from the incomplete contracting
approach where collateral serves as a device to substitute for an efficient bankruptcy code.
Since we have information on the acceptance of assets as collateral by the banks, we can
test the relationships directly. To begin, there is a positive link between the legal system and
the willingness to accept collateral:
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Hypothesis 1 (H1): If the laws on securing collateral are more reliable, then banks will
be more willing to accept collateral in lending.4
Next, we note that the degree of asymmetric information between lender and borrower
varies considerably with different types of borrowers. In the case of government lending the
asymmetric information problem is negligible, since the government can always print money
to avoid default. At the other extreme is lending to new firms or small firms that have no
credit history which makes it difficult for a bank to assess credit risk. Therefore, the ability
to take collateral is especially important for credit contracts with such borrowers. That is,
the higher the degree of asymmetric information between lender and borrower, the more
important is the ability to rely on collateral (see Liberti and Mian 2005). The willingness to
collateralize loans, however, depends on the quality and enforceability of the legal system.
Thus, a legal environment that reliably enables the lender to take collateral should have more
loans to information opaque borrowers. This leads us to our second hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2 (H2): The quality of the legal system and the proportion of a bank’s loans
made to information opaque borrowers are positively correlated. 5
Banks find it considerably more difficult to gather information about solvency of a
small enterprise compared to a large enterprise. Large enterprises are more likely to be
publicly held and therefore obliged to provide audited financial statements. If they are also
publicly traded, the stock markets provide a monitoring function. In contrast, for small
enterprises, banks generally have to rely on unaudited financial information and their sub-
jective judgment of the project to be financed. Thus, asymmetric information problems
4Laws regarding collateral generally distinguish between immovable assets (usually land or real estate) and
movable assets (e.g. machinery, cars, etc.) to be pledged as collateral (Pistor 2000). The BEPS survey makes
this distinction as well so we can test the hypothesis for each type of collateral separately.
5By the quality of the legal system we mean both the laws related to banking transactions and how well
they are applied.
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loom larger in SME lending and, as Berger and Udell (1995) pointed out, collateral is very
important in lending to SMEs. Similarly, Menkhoff et al. (2006) find for a sample of Thai
banks that collaterization is more important for loan contracts with SMEs. As argued before
(H1), the willingness to use collateral depends on the legal system. If the legal system is,
however, not sufficiently good to allow for loans secured by collateral, banks prefer to lend
to customers about whom they can easily obtain information. Large enterprises are clearly
such customers.
Mortgage lending is virtually defined by the existence of collateral that can be taken
to secure the loan. However, the law has to provide the legal context for acquiring prop-
erties when a mortgage is in default. This is not a simple matter particularly for occupied
residential properties. However, once the law defines the collateral relationship and there is
confidence that it can be applied, than mortgage lending should flourish.
Consumer finance usually involves either credit card debt or the purchase of movable
assets. Credit card debt is generally not collateralized and therefore should be independent
of differences in the legal system. Movable assets on the other hand might be used as
collateral. However, the costs of liquidating such collateral can be substantial and banks
are likely to use other means of reducing the risks of consumer finance. Collateral laws are
more likely to be important in SME and mortgage lending and so the proportion of loans
made to consumers may or may not be related to the quality of collateral laws.
Finally, information asymmetries are unlikely to play an important role for govern-
ment lending, since state guarantees are generally the most secure claims in an economy.
The government’s ability to tax makes its borrowing riskless. Thus, banks do not need to
gather information or monitor performance when the government is the borrower. When the
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legal environment makes interactions with private sector borrowers problematic, banks may
prefer to lend to the government and other state entities.
The relationships suggested by this discussion between the overall quality of the legal
environment and bank lending are summarized as follows:
SMEs Large Mortgages Consumer Government
enterprises lending
Quality of law + - + ? -
3. The survey data and descriptive statistics
3.1. Loan data
The BEPS sample design was based on a random sample of 423 banks from 20 countries.
Banks in smaller countries and also in Russia (26% of the sample frame) were over sampled.
More than half the banks (63% when Russia is excluded) agreed to participate and data were
collected from face-to-face interview with 219 high ranking bank managers. With Russia
excluded the response rate was 63%.6 Each bank was linked to the Bank Scope data after a
careful examination to make sure that the correct Bank Scope data was used. That is, care
was taken to make sure that the Bank Scope data used had the proper bank identification and
level of consolidation.7 When the Bank Scope data for the 423 banks in the EBRD sample
frame are compared to the data for the 219 banks that responded to the survey, there is no
6The countries with the lowest response rates were, in addition to Russia, the Ukraine and also Hungary
and the Czech Republic. Successful bankers in the advanced transition countries might have been less inclined
to set aside the time for an EBRD interview than others. In the tense environment in Russia and the Ukraine
bankers might have had other reasons to avoid responding.
7The Bank Scope data set was prepared by Dr. Anita Taci of the EBRD.
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indication of systematic response bias.8 The actual sample sizes in the empirical analysis
is often smaller because Bank Scope does not cover a handful of banks that responded
to the survey and, more importantly, responses for some questions are missing for many
banks.9 As noted earlier, the BEPS survey asked the bank manager to provide an allocation
of customer loans among different types. 10 We are able to use these responses to construct
the loan proportions according to the following borrower types:
• Small and medium enterprises (1 to 249 employees),
• Large enterprises (250 or more employees),
• Mortgages,
• Consumer finance,
• Lending to the government and state-owned enterprises, and
• Other lending.
The survey also provided information on bank ownership. We used a majority own-
ership basis for classifying banks as government or foreign owned. Only 9% of the banks
were government owned at the time of the survey.11 In fact the privatization process was
largely completed in all of the transition countries. Even banks that reverted to government
ownership during banking crises in the late 1990s (e.g. in Romania and Croatia) had been
privatized when the survey was conducted in 2005. Fully 61% of the respondent banks are
8In most countries the average asset level and the return on assets are about the same for responding and
non-responding banks. The correlation of the country average ROAs from full sample and from the survey
respondents is 0.97 and the rank correlation is 0.76.
9The survey design included all banks in the country which might include some institutions which are not
picked up by Bank Scope. There were 17 respondent banks excluded because there was not adequate Bank
Scope data for 2004 in Moldova, 3 in Macedonia, 3 in Belarus, 2 in Slovakia and 1 in each of Bosnia, Bulgaria,
Poland, Serbia, and Ukraine. One additional Serbian bank is eliminated because of inconsistencies in the Bank
Scope data.
10The questionnaire is available form the authors upon request.
11The state owned banks including two for which there is no Bank Scope information were concentrated in
a few countries, 3 each in Belarus, Bosnia and Serbia and 2 in the Czech Republic and one in each of 7 other
countries.
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foreign. The foreign banks include both greenfield banks and banks acquired by mergers
and acquisitions. Definitions of all varibales are summarized in Table I.
Table II shows summary statistics for the lending ratios for all respondent banks and
then divides the banks by ownership, region and size. The row totals do not add to 100
because other lending is not shown and also because the sample sizes used to calculate the
means often differ due to non responses.
Perhaps the most striking observation from Table II is that foreign banks do less lend-
ing to SMEs than either government or domestic private banks. One explanation for this
is that foreign banks generally have to overcome cultural barriers and therefore bear higher
information costs than their domestic counterparts (Buch 2003). These barriers may be
formidable when it comes to information gathering about opaque SMEs so foreign banks
are much less likely than other banks to lend to small business (Stiglitz 2003, Sengupta
forthcoming, Mian 2006, Berger et al. 2001). Giannetti and Ongena (2005) claim that for-
eign banks in a sample of transition countries lack the local information that is particularly
important for lending in countries where asymmetric information problems are severe.12
Such local information is generally easier to collect for domestic banks through relationship
banking (Berger and Udell 2002).
However, foreign banks are more active lenders to households, particularly for mort-
gages. The foreign banks may do more mortgage lending because the specific expertise
regarding mortgage contracts can be transferred from the parent company. Lending to gov-
ernments and government affiliates is only prominent among state owned banks. Differences
12However, they find that foreign bank entry is overall beneficial to a country. Moreover, Bonin et al. (2005)
find that foreign banks in transition are more efficient and perform well.
10
in mortgage lending tend to be country specific because not all the transition countries have
defined mortgage contracts.
Since, the number of respondents from many countries is too small to make a compar-
ison of averages by countries informative, we show the means for three country groups: the
8 transition countries that are now members of the European Union (EU), the countries of
the former Soviet Union (FSU) with the exception of the Baltic countries which are already
part of the EU, and the countries of South Eastern Europe (SEE).13 Mortgage lending is
primarily found in the EU countries where the legal infrastructure for such loans is in place.
Banks in the FSU do more corporate lending, perhaps because many of them are corporate
affiliates or house banks although banks in the FSU do more lending to both large and small
enterprises.
Finally, we group the banks into three size groups with roughly about a third of the
banks in each group: Assets less than $200 million, between $200 million and $1 billion
and in excess of $1 billion. Smaller banks do more SME lending, while larger banks prefer
to lend to large enterprises. The latter observation has been stated in the current banking
literature by Berger et al. (2001). Large banks do less corporate lending overall, in part
because they are more active in household lending.
13The countries are:
EU: Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia;
FSU: Belarus, Kazakhstan, Moldova, Russia, Ukraine;
SEE: Albania, Bosnia, Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia, Romania, Serbia.
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3.2. Acceptance of collateral
The BEPS survey provides information about bankers’ willingness to accept collateral. We
construct measures of the frequency with which banks accept immovable assets as collateral
and another variable for the frequency of acceptance of movable assets.
The survey asks bankers how frequently they accept different types of assets as col-
lateral on a scale of 1 (Never) to 6 (Always).14 The responses for the different asset types
were averaged so the overall indicator ranges from 1 to 6 for both movable and immovable
assets. These indicator scores provide an ordinal ranking rather than an objective numerical
measure of intensity. For this reason we create dummy variables that separate responses
into high (scores from 4 to 6) and low (scores from 1 to 3) groups for the acceptance of
collateral measures. Specifically the dummy variables for the “Acceptance of (im)movable
assets” takes the value of one if a bank accepts (im)movable assets frequently as collateral
and zero otherwise.
3.3. Objective measures for the legal environment
The law and finance literature measures the quality of the legal or banking environment with
national indicators. We follow in this tradition with measures of the quality of the banking
environment constructed from EBRD information. In addition, we also utilize information
concerning the individual bankers’ perceptions of the environment from the BEPS survey.
Thus, two types of legal indicators are examined in this paper. The first, described in this
section, are objective measures of the legal environment for banking. The second type
14The survey asset categories land and buildings were classified as immovable assets. Movable assets in-
clude vehicles, other tangible movable property (e.g., business equipment) and inventory (stocks of goods to
be sold).
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reflects the bank managers’ assessment of the legal environment which are described in the
next section.
Our national measures of the banking environment are based on data collected by the
2004 EBRD Legal Transition Programme (LTP).15 Two country specific objective measures
of the banking legal environment are constructed from LTP.
The first indicator measures how well a lender’s claim can be enforced (referred to as
LTP - Enforcement of law). It is based on three EBRD indices, each with a score that ranges
from 0 to 10:
(i) the amount that can be expected to be recovered from a debtor,
(ii) the time needed to realize recovery, and
(iii) the simplicity of the legal process to be followed.
Our indicator, LTP - Enforcement of law, is the sum which ranges between 0 and 30.
As before, the sum of the scores does not have any meaning that would justify its use as
a continuous variable. It provides an ordinal ranking rather than some objective numerical
measure of intensity. Therefore, we additionally rank the countries by the scores and create a
dummy variable that reflects whether a country has a high or low quality of law enforcement
score. This indicator is referred to as LTP - Enforcement of law (dum) and it has a value of
one for countries with a high quality of law enforcement score. 16
The second measure is an index of the quality of collateral law, referred to as LTP -
Quality of law. It is based on six criteria concerning the legal regime for secured trans-
15See EBRD Legal Survey (2004) for further details.
16We compared results with different that used 25, 50 or 75th percentile of the sum as the cut off point for
the dummy variable. The regression results shown below uses the dummy based on the 75th percentile cut-off
which performs best.
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actions, which are shown in Appendix A. EBRD gives a country a score ranging from 0
to 3 on each criterion and the overall measure is the sum of the scores. Consequently our
LTP - Quality of law indicator ranges from 0 to 18. For the same reasons mentioned above,
we also construct a dummy measure that separates countries into groups with high and low
quality of law (LTP - Quality of law [dum]).
The LTP indicators are country specific. However, the grouping of countries by the
quality of the banking environment does not correspond with a simple separation between
advanced transition countries and the others. For example, for both variables, Albania is
in the high quality banking environment group and Poland is in the low quality banking
environment.
3.4. Bankers’ perceptions of the environment
The BEPS survey asked bank managers about their perceptions of law enforcement and of
the quality of collateral laws for both movable and immovable assets. In each instance,
the bank manager was given several relevant criteria and asked to provide a response on a
six point scale. In order to synthesize the diffuse responses we follow Hoshi (2006) and
aggregate the responses to construct indicators of positive views about law enforcement and
collateral laws. Further, we divided each of the overall indicators into two groups reflecting
high and low perceptions of the legal quality on each dimension.
The questions about perception of movable and immovable collateral law present four
statements (the specific statements are in Appendix B) and ask the responding bank execu-
tive to indicate the extent of his or her agreement on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to
6 (strongly agree). We added the scores (using averages for missing responses) in order to
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get an overall indicator of respondents’ confidence in the collateral laws. We then exam-
ined the distribution of the scores and divided the respondents into two groups reflecting
high and low confidence in the collateral laws for both movable (BEPS - immovable assets
perception) and fixed collateral separately (BEPS - movable assets perception).
A similar procedure was used to distinguish bankers with high and low confidence in
the ability of the court system to resolve disputes. BEPS respondents were asked to express
their agreement with five statements on a scale from 1 (never) to 6 (always); e.g. whether
the system is fair and impartial, affordable, able to enforce decisions, etc. (the questions
are shown in Appendix B). This indicator, which we refer to as BEPS - Court perceptions),
ranges from 5 to 30. As before, we also separate respondents into groups with high and low
confidence in the court system to construct the dummy variable BEPS - Court perception
(dum) which has a value of one for bankers with high confidence.
3.5. Country controls and instruments
In our empirical analysis we test a variety of country control variables to account for coun-
try heterogeneity. Data on the CPI inflation rate, GDP per capita, GDP per capita growth,
the interest rate spread and the ration of private credit to GDP are taken from the World
Bank Development Indicators. Several studies (Pagano and Jappelli 1993; Jappelli and
Pagano 2002; Djankov et al. forthcoming) underlined the importance of information pro-
vision mechanisms as a determinant of credit supply. Therefore, we also test the ‘Credit
information index’ from the World Bank ‘Doing Business’ survey that measures rules af-
fecting the scope, access, and quality of credit information in each country. Finally, we
tested Fitch’s sovereign debt ratings which we refer to as the ‘Country risk rating’.
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In the later analysis we use the bankers’ perceptions of the institutional characteris-
tics as an explanatory variable. Since these perception indicators might be endogenously
related to the bankers’ lending decisions we will instrument for institutional perception with
measures of the actual contract and debt enforcement processes in each country. Unlike the
other explanatory variables, these instruments are not affected by bank lending behavior.
Thus, the instruments are correlated with bankers’ perceptions but not with the residuals in
the lending equations. Information on contract enforcement has been identified by Djankov
et al. (2003) and collected by the World Bank ‘Doing Business’ survey. It provides us with
three valid instruments for the banker’s perceptions of the legal system. The first is ‘Pro-
cedures’ or the number of interactions mandated by law or regulation between the parties
which consists of steps to file the case, steps for trial and judgment and steps necessary to
enforce the judgment. The second, ‘Time,’ records the number of calendar days from the
time the plaintiff files a lawsuit until payment is made. The third instrumental variable,
‘Cost,’ is the cost of enforcing a contract (including court costs and average attorney fees)
as a percentage of the claim. An additional instrument is a measure of the ‘Efficiency’ of
debt enforcement in each of our sample countries taken from Djankov et al. (2006). It is a
constructed measure of the efficiency of debt enforcement based on local practitioner’s eval-
uations of a hypothetical case of a debt default and insolvency. Definitions and summary
statistics for our controls and instruments are summarized in Table I.
3.6. Summary statistics
The interrelationships among the five measures of the banking environment (the three BEPS
perceptions measures and the two LTP objective or actual measures) are summarized in Ta-
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ble III which shows the correlations among the summed indicator scores. The correlations
are generally not large. In particular, the correlations between the perceived quality mea-
sures and the actual quality measures are small, which indicates that both variables contain
different information. One reason for this low correlation between actual and perception
legal indicators might be that many bankers in countries with objectively poor quality of
law (according to LTP - Quality of law) report a good perception of their legal environment.
Overall we observe a higher within country variation of the BEPS perception responses
in countries with a relative poor score in the LTP survey. This discussion underlines the
importance of differentiating between actual law and its perception.
4. Empirical Results
4.1. Acceptance of collateral
Our hypothesis H1 implies that collateral is only effective as a tool to overcome asymmetric
information in the borrower-lender relationship, if the legal environment is sufficiently good.
That is, banks will only accept collateral, if they have a good perception of the law that
protects collateral for the lender. The banker’s choice to accept a certain type of collateral
is examined with a probit model where the dependent variable has a value of one if the i-th
bank in the j-th country accepts certain assets as collateral:
(Acceptance of (im)movable assets)i j = β0 +β1 · log(Assetsi j)+ (1)
β2 ·Ownershipi j +β3 ·Country Controls j +β4 ·LEGALi j + εi j
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We control for both the size and ownership in equation (1) and are particularly interested
in the coefficient β4 which measures the effect of the legal indicator on the willingness to
accept collateral.
Probit estimates are shown in Table IV for immovable assets (columns 1 to 5) and
movable assets (columns 6 to 10). Overall, there is some indication that larger banks and
domestic banks (the omitted group) are more willing to use collateral. Both the quality of the
law enforceability and the perception of collateral laws have a significant positive effect on
a bank’s acceptance of collateral. The results are robust; both the perception and the actual
quality of the law are significant when they enter the probit model separately (columns 2,3
and 7,8) with the one exception of the enforcement of law on the acceptance of movable
assets. In columns 1-3 and columns 6-8, the legal indicators are the summed responses.
A robustness check is provided in columns 4-5 and 9-10 when the legal indicators are the
dummy variables. Results are the same whether we use sum or dummy variable definitions
of our legal indicators.
These probit estimates suffer from endogeneity bias since bankers’ behavior is the de-
pendent variable and the same bankers’ perceptions of the environment appear as explana-
tory variables. However, clear support for our hypothesis is also found when the exogenous
legal measure (LTP - Enforcement) is used by itself. All in all these results provide clear
support for hypothesis H1.
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To provide some interpretation of the probit results, we calculate the marginal impact
of the environmental variables on the probability of accepting collateral. Recall that the
probit model for a binary outcome variable Y is:
Pr(Y = 1|X = x) = Φ(x′β) (2)
where Φ is the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution. Thus, an
estimated coefficient, β, is not the marginal impact of a variable on the probability of accept-
ing collateral. The marginal effects are easily calculated and some examples are presented
in Table V. We show the estimated probability of collateral acceptance for a domestic bank
that has mean asset size with different combinations of the legal indicators. For example,
such a bank has a probability of about 81 percent of accepting immovable assets as collateral
if its legal perception and environment are good. If the legal perception and environment
are bad, the probability is only about 44 percent. The influence of the legal measures on the
probability of collateral acceptance is of similar magnitude in other examples.
4.2. Lending and the banking environment
Our second hypothesis, H2, relates to the effect of the legal environment on a banker’s
decision to lend to certain types of borrowers. To test these relationships, we include the
legal indicators in a system of equations for the composition of the banks’ loan portfolio.
The dependent variables are the percentages of total lending which sum to one and we also
control for bank size, ownership and country specific characteristics. The simultaneous
system is given by:
(Lending ratios)i jk = β0k +β1klog(Assetsi j)+β2kOwnershipi j + (3)
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β3kCountry Controls j +β4kLEGALi j + εi jk
where i indexes banks, j countries and k the lending categories.17 Since the LTP indica-
tors only vary by country, country fixed effects which would absorb the variation in the
legal variables cannot be included. Instead, we include each country’s GDP per capita and
inflation rate to control for country heterogeneity.
The aim of this system is to examine the allocation of the lending portfolio among
SME, large enterprise lending, mortgages, consumer finance, government lending and other
loans. Since all categories add to 100 percent, other lending is explained by the other cate-
gories and is therefore left out of the estimation. We will estimate (3) first as a simultaneous
system of seemingly unrelated regression (SUR, Zellner 1962) in order to account for cross
equation error correlation. We will also present instrumental variable estimates to account
for possible endogeneity of the perception variables.
The SUR estimates of (3) are shown in Table VI. The coefficients of the control vari-
ables are as expected. Enterprise lending is significantly related to bank size - negatively
for SMEs and positively for large enterprises. Interestingly, the domestic private banks (the
omitted ownership category) do more lending to enterprises, both SMEs and large enter-
prises while government banks lend more to the government. The inflation rate is negatively
correlated to mortgage finance and positively to large enterprise lending while GDP per
capita has little influence on the lending ratios.
The legal environment has a significant effect on the loan portfolio composition of
banks. Bankers that have a better perception about their court system lend relatively more
17By construction, the lending ratios are bound between zero and one. Histograms of the loan ratios indicate
that the underlying distributions are, however, symmetric.
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to SMEs and less to large enterprises. The higher the score on the LTP - Enforcement of
law variable the less banks lend for consumer finance and the more for mortgage finance.
Finally, better law enforcement is associated with less government lending. These results
are entirely consistent with the earlier discussion of hypothesis H2.
Both the bankers’ perceptions of the legal environment and the objective measures of a
country’s quality of law enforcement affect the portfolio allocations. Since the magnitudes
of the two variables are similar (the mean of BEPS - Court perception is 16.96 and of LTP
- Enforcement of law is 19.54) we can compare the coefficients. Bankers’ perceptions are
the dominant influence on enterprise lending, the shift towards SMEs and away from large
enterprises. National quality of law is the more influential determinant of household and
government lending.
The overall impact of the legal environment on lending ratios can be measured by
considering one standard deviation increase in both legal environment variables. The effort
of such an improvement on lending ratios is shown below (figures are based on specification
(3) as reported in Table VI). Improvements in the legal environment are associated with
important changes in lending patterns. There is a shift away from large enterprises and
consumer lending and government and towards SMEs and mortgages.
SMEs Large Consumer Mortgages Government Other
enterprises lending
3.76% -5.36% -5.09% 4.79% -2.26% 4.16%
The use of perceptions to measure the quality of the legal environment might entail an
endogeneity problem. Bankers that know that they lend more to information opaque borrow-
ers might claim that they have more trust in the legal system in order to justify their lending
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decision. This endogeneity problem might cause an upward bias in the BEPS coefficients in
Table VI (Engle et al. 1983). For this reason, we provide as an alternative instrumental vari-
able estimates of the system (3). As discussed earlier we believe that measures for contract
and debt enforceability are valid instruments for a bankers’ perceptions regarding the court
system because they should be correlated with bankers’ perceptions but not with the portfo-
lio allocations. The specific instruments used, in addition to the other independent variables,
are the efficiency of debt enforcement, the average days it takes to enforce a contract and
the number of procedures to enforce a contract through court (see Table I for definitions).
Instrumental variable estimates of (3) are shown in Table VII.
The instrumental variable estimates are qualitatively the same as those shown with
SUR estimates in Table VI except that the coefficients on the BEPS perception variable are
larger. The overall effect of an improvement in the legal environment (i.e. a one standard
deviation increase in both legal variables) has the same effect as before. However, with
these results the predicted shift from large enterprise and consumer lending to SMEs and
mortgages are larger.
In both Tables VI and VII, the legal variables are sums of responses to various questions
or sums over several indicator variables. As noted earlier, these ordinal measures may not
be appropriate as continuous variables in a regression analysis. Alternatively, we construct
dummy variables that categorize each of the legal indicators into two groups. In Table VIII,
we present a summary of estimates of system (3) that use the dummy indicators for the
legal environment variables. Only a summary of the results is shown, the coefficients on
the legal variables and the R-squared from both SUR and IV estimates. The SUR estimates
with the dummy legal indicators can be compared to the SUR estimates in Table VI and the
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IV estimates to those in Table VII. If anything, the results are stronger with dummy legal
variables. The R-squared shown in Table VIII are larger than in the corresponding equations
in Tables VI and VII. When bankers’ perceptions are in the top of the distribution there is
substantially more SME lending and less large enterprise lending. The shift into mortgage
lending and out of consumer and government lending by banks in countries with higher
quality of law enforcement is significant but not as large as the impact on enterprise lending.
Summarizing, we find that the legal environment is an important determinant of the
composition of the loan portfolio. We find that banks that operate in a better legal envi-
ronment lend proportionally more to SMEs and give out more mortgages. Further, we find
that in a good legal environment especially the proportion of lending to large enterprises,
government and other household lending is lower.
4.3. Robustness tests and further evidence
In this section, we provide estimates of alternative specifications of the loan proportions
model (3) in order to establish the robustness of our conclusions. To begin, we have, so far
shown estimates with both the perceptions (BEPS) and objective (LTP) legal measures in
our system. In Table IX we show the coefficients of these legal indicators when the LTP
and BEPS measure enter the equation system separately. In the first two rows we enter the
sum indicators and in the last two rows the dummy indicators in our basic specification.
Including the indicators separately generally improves our results.
Additionally, there is a possibility that our legal indicators capture cross-country het-
erogeneity rather than differences in the legal environment. The basic specification included
two country controls GDP per capita and inflation and in Table X we show estimates with
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additional controls - the interest rate spread, GDP growth rate, ratio of private credit to GDP,
the country risk rating, the credit registry indicator as well as dummy variables for regions.18
The regional dummies enter the system significantly. There is proportionally less enterprise
lending and more household lending in the EU countries. Higher GDP growth is corre-
lated with lower government lending. The interest rate spread, size of the credit market,
country risk ratings as well as the credit registry indicator are mostly unrelated to the loan
portfolio composition of bankers. Most importantly, including these country controls in our
system has hardly any effect on the size or significance of our legal indicators. These results
strongly suggest that the legal indicators included in our system do not simply account for
country heterogeneity but for the prevailing influence of differences in the legal environment
banks operate in.
While the LTP measures only vary by country, the BEPS measures vary at the bank
level. Thus, in equations which only include the BEPS measure we can completely control
for cross-country heterogeneity by including country fixed effects. This is a considerable
advantage over the original ‘Law and Finance’ literature, since countries that differ in their
legal systems are likely to also differ in other dimensions that are difficult to account for. In
Table XI, we show results that include only the BEPS measures of perceptions of the legal
environment and also add country fixed effects to the equations.19 The legal coefficients
are virtually unchanged when compared to the specifications without country effects (see
Table IX). Thus, the significant impact of law perception on the lending decision of banks
is caused by bank and not country variation. This suggests that it is not only the actual legal
18The regions are the EU countries, other former Soviet Union countries and Southern Eastern European
countries.
19GDP pc and inflation were removed from the specification for this estimation, since the variation of these
variables is picked up by the country effects.
24
system existing in a country (LTP measure) but also the individual banker’s perception of
these laws (BEPS measure) that matters for the lending decision of banks.
Finally, we want to test whether our findings only hold for the specific legal indicators
utilized. From the LTP survey we also constructed a second legal indicator LTP - Quality
of law (dum). In Table XII we show that results including this indicator are stronger than
results with the LTP - Enforcement of law (dum) variable (see Table VIII, panel I). Here,
also the LTP measure shows a positive correlation between a better legal environment and
the proportion of SME lending. However, estimates with the LTP - Quality of law indicator
as a sum variable (not shown) is somewhat weaker.
5. Conclusion
The legal environment does not only influence credit market development but also has an
important impact on the customers banks lend to. The better the legal system the more
willing a bank is to accept different types of assets as collateral and the more willing a bank
is to lend to information opaque borrowers. On the contrary, the worse the legal environment
the more a bank lends to customers that can either provide guarantees (government lending)
or easily provide information about their projects (large enterprise lending). Thus, a better
legal environment fosters private capital formation.
We find that a banker’s willingness to accept collateral is associated with the quality
of the legal system. When banks find themselves in a good institutional environment, they
accept collateral as a security for lending contracts that involve a high degree of asymmet-
ric information. If bankers have low perceptions of the quality of their environment they
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will not enter such contracts and rather channel their funds to large and government-owned
enterprises. Finally, we find that not only the legal environment, but also the perception
bankers have concerning the legal system matters for the allocation of bank lending.
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A. Construction of LTP - Quality of law indicator
In the following the underlying criteria of the LTP - Quality of law indicator are listed:
(i) Does the charge create a proprietary security right?
(ii) Can the charge be granted by any person?
(iii) Can the charge be granted to any person?
(iv) Can the charge secure any debt?
(v) Can the charge cover all types of asset?
(vi) Does the charge give priority over all other creditors?
For each of these criteria the EBRD assigns a score between 0 and 3, with zero meaning that
a criteria is not fulfilled at all and 3 means a criteria is fully implemented. We sum up the scores of
the six criteria, which yields us an indicators for the quality of the law related to secured transactions
(LTP - Quality of law).
B. Construction of BEPS perception indicators
- BEPS (im)movable assets perception
Measures of perceptions of the banking environment were constructed from three other questions.
The questionnaire included one question concerning a banker’s perception towards laws related to
movable assets and another question related to immovable assets. For both questions four statements
were presented to which the responding bank executive indicated the extent of his or her agreement
on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 6 (strongly agree). These four statements are illustrated in
the questionnaire excerpt shown below for the question concerning movable assets and are identical
for the question relating to immovable assets. We added the scores (using averages for missing
responses) in order to get an overall measure of respondents’ confidence in the collateral laws. This
yields our indicator BEPS - movable assets perception and BEPS - immovable assets perception.
BEPS Questionnaire: Question #32
Q.32 Thinking of the laws on the books in your country in 2004 related to pledges (loans
secured by movable assets), to what extent do you agree with the following statements?
a.) The laws provide adequate scope of security (e.g., types of assets received as collateral, types
of debt that can be secured)
b.) The laws enable efficient creation and perfection of security rights (simple, cheap, fast)
c.) The laws enable efficient enforcement of security rights (simple, cheap, fast)
d.) The laws adequately protect secured creditor rights
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- BEPS Court perception
Finally, we use a question related to the ability of the court system to resolve business disputes.
Respondents were asked to express their agreement with five statements on a scale from 1 (never) to
6 (always). These five statements are illustrated in the questionnaire excerpt II below.
BEPS Questionnaire: Question #44
Q.44 How often do you associate the following descriptions with the court system in resolving
business disputes?
a.) Fair and impartial
b.) Honest and uncorrupted
c.) Quick and efficient
d.) Affordable
e.) Able to enforce its decisions
There are four dummy variables that measure the respondents’ perceptions of the banking en-
vironment. A value of one indicates high degree of confidence in the collateral laws (movable and
mortgage), the court system and the bank regulators. We added the scores of these five statements
(using averages for missing responses) in order to get an overall measure of respondents’ confidence
in the court system (BEPS - Court perception). As described in the main test we also construct a 1/0
dummy variable in order to divide the survey into groups with high and low confidence in the court
system (BEPS - Court perception [dum]).
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Table I
Definition and sources of variables
Variable Definition Mean St. Dev. Source
I. BEPS and LTP legal indicators
Acceptance of see Section 3.2 3.73 1.19 BEPS survey
immovable assets
Acceptance of see Section 3.2 3.27 1.07 BEPS survey
movable assets
LTP - Enforcement of see Section 3.3 19.54 6.61 LTP survey
law
LTP - Quality of see Appendix A 15.07 1.54 LTP survey
law
BEPS - Court see Appendix B 16.96 4.58 BEPS survey
perception
BEPS - Perception of see Appendix B 15.16 3.98 BEPS survey
immovable assets
BEPS - Perception of see Appendix B 14.58 4.19 BEPS survey
movable assets
II. Control variables
GOV value of one if bank is owned 0.08 0.28 BEPS survey/
by government (zero otherwise) hand collected
FOR value of one if bank is foreign 0.53 0.50 BEPS survey/
owned (zero otherwise) hand collected
EU value of one if bank is located 0.34 0.47 BEPS survey
in a EU country (zero otherwise)
SEE value of one if bank is located 0.37 0.48 BEPS survey
in a SEE country (zero otherwise)
log(Assets) total assets 13.13 1.59 Bankscope (2006)
GDP pc GDP per capita in 1000s US$ 3.18 2.17 World Bank (2006)
Inflation GDP price deflator in annual % 9.22 6.60 World Bank (2006)
Country risk Fitch ratings on long-term government debt 10.86 3.20 FitchRatings (2006)
rating (local currency) translated to numeric ranking
Credit info index that measures rules affecting 2.42 2.05 World Bank (2007)
index the scope, access, and quality of credit information
Domestic credit domestic credit as % of GDP 37.74 15.12 World Bank (2006)
GDP growth GDP growth rate in annual % 6.93 2.07 World Bank (2006)
Interest spread lending rate minus deposit rate 5.86 2.53 World Bank (2006)
III. Instruments
Procedures number of procedures from moment plaintiff 30.74 6.81 World Bank (2007)
files lawsuit until moment of payment
Time calendar days to resolve the dispute 449.20 287.14 World Bank (2007)
Cost cost in court fees and attorney fees as 14.10 4.58 World Bank (2007)
percentage of debt value
Efficiency measure of the efficiency of debt enforcement 42.66 16.95 Djankov et al. (2006)
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Table II
Descriptive statistics of lending ratios
Enterprise lending Household lending Government
SME large enter. mortgage consumer lending
I. Total
mean 40.51 19.32 8.80 16.17 5.61
st dev 27.72 21.93 15.55 19.17 11.89
obs 128 128 172 168 194
II. Ownership
mean 40.00 7.49 1.91 13.76 15.28
gov st dev 31.99 9.72 2.98 11.58 22.59
obs 11 11 15 14 16
mean 48.24 23.55 6.10 13.43 3.28
dom st dev 25.75 25.51 12.38 15.17 6.89
obs 48 48 67 67 77
mean 35.22 18.26 11.96 18.66 5.85
for st dev 27.49 19.95 18.06 22.45 11.87
obs 69 69 90 87 101
III.Region
mean 32.47 13.24 16.12 16.06 7.35
EU st dev 28.50 19.49 23.54 24.34 13.49
obs 35 35 59 56 64
mean 41.81 15.64 6.87 19.29 5.25
SEE st dev 26.75 16.27 5.91 17.53 12.37
obs 55 55 65 65 71
mean 46.04 30.24 2.43 11.98 4.14
FSU st dev 27.42 27.16 5.88 12.94 9.08
obs 38 38 48 47 59
IV. Size
mean 52.43 11.89 7.52 16.15 4.39
<200 st dev 26.69 15.80 18.40 19.58 12.27
obs 41 41 53 53 57
mean 39.65 20.18 7.06 17.63 4.41
200- st dev 28.29 22.30 10.18 22.29 10.96
1000 obs 54 54 67 67 78
mean 27.60 28.02 11.60 15.16 7.52
>1000 st dev 21.67 25.56 13.30 13.58 11.81
obs 30 30 46 43 54
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Table III
Correlations between different measures of legal environment
LTP - Quality LTP - Enforcement BEPS - Court BEPS - movable BEPS - immovable
of law of law perception assets perception assets perception
LTP - Quality 1
of law
LTP - Enforcement 0.40 1
of law
BEPS - court -0.03 0.11 1
perception
BEPS - movable 0.17 0.22 0.43 1
assets perception
BEPS - immovable 0.23 0.28 0.34 0.80 1
assets perception
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Table IV: Probit regression results
Notes: Coefficients of probit estimates of (1). Acceptance of collateral is a binary variable that takes the value of 1 if a bank has a high acceptance of
(im)movable assets as collateral and 0 otherwise. Standard errors are reported in parentheses below each coefficient. Estimated are based on 171 observations.
***,**,* indicate significance at the 1, 5, 10 % level, respectively. In table columns labeled with # the legal indicators is defined as a dummy variable. In all
other columns the legal inidcators are included in their original form (the sum of all sub-criteria).
Acceptance of immovable assets Acceptance of movable assets
(1) (2) (3) (4)# (5)# (6) (7) (8) (9)# (10)#
const. -1.601 -0.774 -1.538 -0.985 -0.580 -3.501 -1.740 -3.416 -2.657 -2.372
(1.02) (0.95) (0.96) (0.96) (0.93) (1.00)*** (0.94)* (0.98)*** (0.92)*** (0.89)***
log(Assets) 0.163 0.162 0.170 0.164 0.166 0.145 0.130 0.144 0.190 0.179
(0.07)** (0.074)** (0.07)** (0.08)** (0.07)** (0.07)** (0.07)* (0.07)** (0.07)*** (0.07)***
Foreign -0.311 -0.350 -0.413 -0.407 -0.423 -0.130 -0.322 -0.127 -0.084 -0.163
(0.23) (0.23) (0.22)* (0.24)* (0.23)* (0.23) (0.24) (0.23) (0.23) (0.22)
Government -0.601 -0.736 -0.707 -0.663 -0.810 -0.286 -0.191 -0.290 -0.305 -0.397
(0.41) (0.39)* (0.37)* (0.40)* (0.39)** (0.39) (0.41) (0.39) (0.38) (0.37)
GDP pc -0.193 -0.194 -0.143 -0.184 -0.182 -0.133 -0.161 -0.139 -0.138 -0.142
(0.06)*** (0.06)*** (0.06)*** (0.06)*** (0.06)*** (0.06)** (0.07)** (0.06)** (0.07)** (0.07)**
Inflation -0.079 -0.084 -0.077 -0.080 -0.085 0.065 0.052 0.065 0.067 0.066
(0.02)*** (0.02)*** (0.02)*** (0.02)*** (0.02)*** (0.02)*** (0.02)*** (0.02)*** (0.02)*** (0.02)***
BEPS - (im)movable 0.056 - 0.062 0.592 - 0.103 - 0.105 0.589 -
asset perception (0.03)** (0.02)*** (0.21)*** (0.03)*** (0.03)*** (0.25)**
LTP - Enforcement 0.019 0.028 - 0.441 0.498 0.007 0.023 - 0.358 0.458
of law (0.02) (0.02)* (0.23)** (0.22)** (0.02) (0.01) (0.28) (0.27)*
LR statistic 31.21 27.73 30.58 36.06 28.73 50.17 34.67 50.00 41.60 36.16
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Table V
Examples illustrating the interpretation of probit coefficients
Notes: This table reports implied probabilities of a domestic bank with mean asset size accepting collateral
conditional on different legal settings based on estimates in Table IV, (4) and (9).
Probability of accepting immovable assets as collateral
LTP - Quality of law
poor good
BEPS - immovable low 44.43% 61.79%
assets perception high 67.36% 81.33%
Probability of accepting movable assets as collateral
LTP - Quality of law
poor good
BEPS - movable low 49.60% 63.68%
assets perception high 71.90% 82.64%
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Table VI
SUR estimates for loan portfolio decision - sum indicators
Notes: SUR estimates for system (3). Standard errors are reported in parentheses. The regressions were run
for 219 banks for the year 2004. The bottom line of the table states the adjusted R-squared of each estimation.
***,**,* indicate significance at the 1, 5, 10 % level, respectively.
Enterprise Household
SME Large Ent. Consumer Mortgage Government
const. 99.780 -17.747 18.874 1.826 3.303
(24.49)*** (18.90) (15.60) (11.92) (9.41)
log(Assets) -4.262 3.469 0.707 -0.301 0.267
(1.79)** (1.38)*** (1.17) (0.90) (0.68)
Foreign -8.521 -5.684 4.003 3.619 2.816
(5.47) (4.22) (3.48) (2.68) (2.13)
Government -6.417 -12.526 1.547 -5.559 10.085
(8.92) (6.85)* (5.95) (4.42) (3.62)***
GDP pc -1.639 -0.739 0.736 0.076 1.002
(1.35) (1.04) (0.88) (0.67) (0.56)*
Inflation -0.616 1.248 -0.215 -0.422 -0.071
(0.43) (0.33)*** (0.27) (0.21)** (0.17)
BEPS - Court 1.175 -0.920 -0.131 0.060 0.128
perception (0.57)** (0.44)** (0.36) (0.27) (0.22)
LTP - Enforcement -0.245 -0.174 -0.680 0.683 -0.431
of law (0.41) (0.32) (0.25)*** (0.19)*** (0.15)***
R-squared 21.18% 25.36% 7.10% 17.82% 13.57%
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Table VII
IV estimates for loan portfolio decision - sum indicators
Notes: Regression results for system (3) with two-stage-least-squares. The instruments used are: efficiency of
debt enforcement, average days it takes to collect defaulted debt, number of procedures necessary to collect
defaulted debt as well as the other independent variables. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. The
regressions were run for 219 banks for the year 2004. The bottom line of the table states the adjusted R-
squared of each estimation.***,**,* indicate significance at the 1, 5, 10 % level, respectively.
Enterprise Household
SME Large Ent. Consumer Mortgage Government
const. 57.969 0.277 42.870 -7.357 9.632
(41.098) (2.133) (26.931) (21.140) (18.051)
log(Assets) -4.539 4.646 0.534 -0.674 0.083
(2.415)* (1.993)** (1.283) (1.635) (0.786)
Foreign -6.707 -9.646 2.636 4.336 4.065
(7.197) (5.388)* (4.132) (4.336) (2.356)*
Government -7.064 -12.175 0.752 -7.993 11.281
(13.393) (6.727)* (6.127) (4.078)** (6.821)*
GDP -1.936 1.253 0.673 -0.483 1.101
(1.457) (1.054) (0.924) (0.570) (0.725)
Inflation -0.545 1.405 -0.250 -0.454 -0.045
(0.458) (0.363)*** (0.267) (0.234)* (0.213)
BEPS - Perception 3.518 -2.939 -1.277 1.041 -0.165
of law (1.681)** (0.995)** (1.199) (0.688) (0.792)
LTP - Enforcement -0.117 -0.132 -0.664 0.638 -0.426
of law (0.488) (0.298) (0.297)** (0.257)*** (0.193)**
R-squared 13.60% 31.75% 3.89% 11.85% 12.19%
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Table VIII
Regression results for loan portfolio decision - dummy legal indicators
Notes: Regression results for system (3). For the IV estimates in panel II the following instruments are used:
interest spread, domestic credit and GDP growth as well as the other independent variables. Standard errors
are reported in parentheses. The regressions were run for 219 banks for the year 2004. The bottom line of the
table states the adjusted R-squared of each estimation. ***,**,* indicate significance at the 1, 5, 10 % level,
respectively.
Enterprise Household
SME Large Ent. Consumer Mortgage Government
I. SUR estimates
BEPS - Perception 17.783 -12.690 -1.762 -1.104 1.629
of law (dum) (5.17)*** (4.01)*** (3.20) (2.28) (1.90)
LTP - Enforcement 1.981 -8.619 -12.853 14.247 -4.759
of law (dum) (4.89) (4.41)** (3.73)*** (2.73)*** (1.84)***
R-squared 25.75% 28.47% 7.06% 24.90% 12.86%
II. Instrumental variable estimates
BEPS - Perception 34.676 -26.359 -23.793 2.343 -1.394
of law (dum) (18.28)* (12.27)** (13.35)* (9.27) (8.69)
LTP - Enforcement 2.056 -3.139 -7.467 14.357 -5.422
of law (dum) (7.68) (4.33) (4.41)* (4.88)*** (2.83)**
R-squared 24.00% 36.58% 1.19% 24.47% 10.09%
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Table IX
SUR estimates for loan portfolio decision - including LTP and BEPS indicators
separately
Notes: SUR estimates for system (3). Standard errors are reported in parentheses. The regressions were run
for 219 banks for the year 2004. The bottom line of the table states the adjusted R-squared of each estimation.
***,**,* indicate significance at the 1, 5, 10 % level, respectively.
Enterprise Household
SME Large Ent. Consumer Mortgage Government
LTP - Enforcement -0.199 -0.614 -0.493 0.528 -0.369
of law (0.37) (0.40) (0.24)** (0.17)*** (0.13)***
R-squared 19.20% 23.22% 4.85% 15.08% 13.97%
BEPS - Court 1.181 -0.923 -0.146 0.103 0.106
perception (0.57)** (0.43)** (0.37) (0.28) (0.23)
R-squared 21.14% 25.10% 2.23% 10.36% 8.92%
LTP - Enforcement 0.054 -9.667 -9.197 11.633 -4.025
of law (dum) (4.73) (4.22)** (3.70)*** (2.59)*** (1.71)**
R-squared 19.26% 25.86% 4.77% 20.34% 12.04%
BEPS - Court 17.926 -13.322 -2.350 -0.339 1.520
perception (dum) (5.15)*** (4.02)*** (3.31) (2.46) (1.93)
R-squared 25.91% 27.61% 2.30% 10.66% 10.59%
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Table X
SUR estimates for loan portfolio decision - controlling for regional and country effects
(sum indicators)
Notes: SUR estimates for system (3). Standard errors are reported in parentheses. The regressions were run
for 219 banks for the year 2004. The bottom line of the table states the adjusted R-squared of each estimation.
***,**,* indicate significance at the 1, 5, 10 % level, respectively.
Enterprise Household
SME Large Ent. Consumer Mortgage Government
const. 252.817 43.872 -62.005 41.853 -53.369
(124.707)** (99.696) (97.888) (71.786) (44.997)
log(Assets) -2.207 5.685 -1.357 -0.544 0.206
(2.247) (1.797)** (1.535) (1.207) (0.767)
Foreign -10.774 -10.165 7.072 4.522 3.589
(6.750) (5.395)* (4.565) (3.599) (2.392)
Government -5.304 -19.641 8.775 -10.891 2.975
(11.904) (9.457)** (9.983) (7.173) (4.635)
EU -122.495 -81.898 59.689 7.147 37.293
(51.566)** (41.329)* (36.883)* (28.254) (17.347)**
SEE -73.140 -53.592 0.225 -13.249 19.110
(43.241)* (34.691) (0.505)** (22.143) (14.131)
GDP growth 1.840 0.117 1.093 -2.240 -1.920
(2.781) (2.213) (2.215) (1.75) (1.097)*
Interest -4.176 -0.341 1.200 0.398 1.643
spread (3.592) (2.876) (2.254) (1.734) (1.184)
Inflation -4.265 -0.942 2.119 -0.355 0.891
(2.824) (2.262) (2.040) (1.495) (0.957)
Domestic 0.406 -0.056 0.094 -0.279 0.056
credit (0.604) (0.484) (0.394) (0.296) (0.199)
GDP pc -3.748 0.853 2.156 -2.103 0.864
(4.440) (3.552) (3.143) (2.299) (1.556)
Country risk -8.504 -3.987 3.738 -1.393 2.936
rating (6.868) (5.496) (5.243) (3.889) (2.409)
Credit info 2.124 3.004 0.172 -2.572 -0.554
index (5.331) (4.261) (3.779) (2.741) (1.913)
BEPS - Perception 1.635 -1.486 -1.666 -0.299 0.252
of law (0.757)** (0.605)** (0.559) (0.386) (0.259)
LTP - Enforcement -0.254 1.081 -1.666 1.630 -0.527
of law (0.974) (0.782) (0.559)*** (0.414)*** (0.262)**
R-squared 34.12% 40.17% 15.66% 29.91% 23.26%
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Table XI
SUR estimates for loan portfolio decision with for country fixed effects
Notes: SUR estimates for estimating (3). Standard errors are reported in parentheses. The regressions were run
for 219 banks for the year 2004. The bottom line of the table states the adjusted R-squared of each estimation.
***,**,* indicate significance at the 1, 5, 10 % level, respectively.
Enterprise Household
SME Large Ent. Consumer Mortgage Government
BEPS - Court 1.278 -0.754 0.041 -0.061 0.044
perception (0.477)*** (0.398)** (0.347) (0.244) (0.209)
R-squared 37.62% 34.71% 16.94% 31.34% 21.33%
BEPS - Court 16.357 -11.517 -0.339 -0.810 1.444
perception (dum) (4.950)*** (3.966)*** (3.291) (2.399) (1.982)
R-squared 39.80% 37.27% 17.99% 29.20% 21.14%
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Table XII
SUR estimates for loan portfolio decision - LTP Quality of Law (dum)
Notes: SUR estimates for system (3). Standard errors are reported in parentheses. The regressions were run
for 219 banks for the year 2004. The bottom line of the table states the adjusted R-squared of each estimation.
***,**,* indicate significance at the 1, 5, 10 % level, respectively.
Enterprise Household
SME Large Ent. Consumer Mortgage Government
const. 105.914 -32.923 17.374 2.724 3.971
(20.84)*** (19.34)* (14.75) (11.26) (8.68)
log(Assets) -4.852 4.825 0.420 0.017 0.147
(1.68)*** (1.41)*** (1.15) (0.88) (0.66)
Foreign -10.874 -7.721 5.709 2.810 3.689
(5.17)** (4.12)* (3.48)* (2.66) (2.11)*
Government -6.365 -15.820 0.651 -4.828 9.982
(8.33) (7.31)** (5.98) (4.41) (3.58)***
GDP pc -1.844 0.123 -0.672 1.442 -0.030
(1.22) (1.13) (0.865) (0.663)** (0.542)
Inflation -0.347 1.418 -0.413 -0.177 -0.246
(0.41) (0.62)** (0.28) (0.21) (0.17)
BEPS - Court 20.579 -14.634 -1.083 -1.866 2.677
perception (dum) (5.42)*** (4.64)*** (3.54) (2.65) (2.09)
LTP - Quality 11.748 -9.058 -8.617 7.807 -6.257
of law (dum) (7.02)* (4.27)** (3.46)*** (2.59)** (2.09)***
R-squared 28.71% 30.53% 6.74% 15.29% 13.87%
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